Abstract—For various services, OTP (One-Time Password) is increasingly employed to sign in services. The most popular OTP scheme is S/KEY. However, S/KEY scheme is vulnerable to hash collision. In order to solve this problem, Choi and Kim proposed an OTP scheme based on pairing operation. This scheme overcame hash collision problem. Unfortunately, the scheme is vulnerable against insider attack. In this paper, we propose insider attack-resistant OTP scheme based on pairing operation. Our scheme employed zero-knowledge proof to generate OTP values. In short, our scheme sends an OTP and two random numbers encoded with XOR; any adversary has no sense about the random numbers. Our scheme authenticates entities with an OTP and gain a hint on next OTP value from one of random numbers. Consequently, we present insider attack-resistant OTP scheme by eliminating shared parameter among insider (e.g. time stamp).

Index Terms—OTP, zero-knowledge proof, authentication, password, pairing-based cryptography.

The authors are with the Department of Computer Engineering, Pusan National University, Gumjeong-Gu, Busan, Korea (e-mail: astroium@ pusan.ac.kr, howonkim@ pusan.ac.kr).

Cite:Yunjin Lee and Howon Kim, "Insider Attack-Resistant OTP (One-Time Password) Based on Bilinear Maps," International Journal of Computer and Communication Engineering vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 304-308, 2013.